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Abstract
The rise in the level of executive compensation in international banking in the last two decades has been striking. At
the same time, corporate declarations of relative performance evaluation (RPE) have enjoyed widespread popularity.
RPE determines the level of CEO pay by accounting for common market shocks that are out of a CEO’s control,
providing better governance and incentivizing CEOs to maximize shareholder value. In this paper, we test for
evidence of RPE in international banking and pay particular attention to banks that openly disclose its use. To that
end, we collect compensation data on 46 large international banks. Taken as a whole, our sample shows moderate
evidence consistent with RPE. We report stronger evidence once we investigate the subsample of RPE-disclosing
banks. These results hold up to a series of robustness checks. In addition, we find that the use of RPE is positively
related to firm size and negatively related to growth options.
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1 Introduction
The rise in the level of executive compensation in interna-
tional banking in the last two decades has been striking.
By the end of 2003 Citigroup, Lehman Brothers, and
Bear Stearns, large players in the banking industry at that
time, were run by CEOs whose earnings were among the
top ten in the S&P 500 (Hodgson 2004). Two of these
banks—Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns—collapsed in
2008. According to Bebchuk et al. (2010), in spite of obvi-
ous mismanagement the executives of these banks had
received considerable performance-based compensation
packages during the years preceding the financial cri-
sis. Switzerland was not exempt. In 2012, UBS paid out
70 million Swiss Francs to the members of its executive
committees despite a 2.5 billion loss that year. It stands
to reason that the effectiveness of such compensation
schemes have since become subject of ever more heated
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discussions, not least in international banking. The recent
rise in executive compensation has not been confined to
the banking industry. Other industries have been follow-
ing the same trend. Murphy (2013) documents that total
pay for executives in the S&P 500 skyrocketed in the late
2000s.
This general development has also piqued the interest
of economists, who are intrigued by the underlying pay-
setting mechanism. Executive compensation is a classic
example of a principal-agent problem and lies at the heart
of the controversy of corporate separation of ownership
and control (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Put succinctly,
the challenge lies in motivating the CEO (the agent) to
act in the best interest of the shareholder (the principal).
Because the effort of the agent is not perfectly observable,
the principal is not able to force the agent to choose the
action that would be optimal from the principal’s perspec-
tive. This invokes a moral hazard problem. There has been
much discussion about how firms are to solve this agency
problem (Ross 1973; Gjesdal 1982; Mahoney 1995). A
straightforward solution would involve a compensation
scheme which provides proper incentives for the CEO.
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Economic intuition would suggest tying compensation
to firm performance. However, firm performance is also
influenced by a myriad of factors that are beyond the con-
trol of the agent. This exogeneity introduces undesirable
risk into contracting.
This is where relative performance evaluation (RPE)
comes in (Holmstrom 1982). RPE implies that compen-
sation contracts should be linked to firm performance in
relation to peers with similar characteristics. Such con-
tracts account for common shocks that are out of an
agent’s control and thus offer a more conclusive way to
assess the agent’s individual performance. At the same
time, RPE contracts offer the same incentives as con-
tracts based on absolute performance. For shareholders,
knowing that RPE is implemented is of particular impor-
tance because the mechanism creates incentives for CEOs
to increase shareholder wealth.1 The case for employ-
ing RPE in executive compensation contracts, then, seems
clear-cut. Indeed, RPE has become seemingly popular in
practice. Recent studies show that roughly every fourth
firm in the S&P 1500 openly claims to use RPE in their
compensation contracts (Carter et al. 2009; Gong et al.
2011).
In this paper, we test for the existence of RPE in inter-
national banking and pay particular attention to banks
that claim to purport its application. For banks might
have incentives to misreport RPE practice if their board
of directors are prone to managerial influence. Board
members might want to appease executives rather than
constrain them. For example, managers of large banks
in particular usually enjoy a good reputation inside and
outside of the bank, which could be beneficial for the
members of the board. Bebchuk and Fried (2003; 2004)
note that managers also enjoy great authority within the
company, rendering conflict less appealing. Designs of
executive compensation schemes endorsed by the board
of directors might thus succumb to this pressure. This is
not without corporate risk. If managerial compensation
packages are identified as unjustified by relevant out-
siders, managers and directors face considerable social
disapproval, denoted as “outrage” costs by Bebchuk and
Fried (2004). The stronger the negative perception of out-
siders, the greater the managers’ cost of enjoying large
compensation packages. This criticism can be avoided by
camouflaging compensation packages.2 Camouflaging the
peer group of an underperforming bank manager would
make excessive pay more acceptable to the public and
investors. In other words, we might want to be cautious
of flaunting RPE statements; some banks might want to
avoid evaluating the actual performance of their under-
performing manager relative to an appropriate peer group
and instead pick particularly low-performing peers.
RPE has been investigated empirically. Most studies try
to infer its usage by regressing executive compensation
on the performance of a target firm and some measure
of peer group performance. A negative and statistically
significant coefficient on peer performance is taken as
indication that common shocks are being removed from
compensation contracts, constituting evidence of RPE.
The scope of the existing literature is rather limited. The
focus lies on compensation practices of industrial firms,
typically in the USA.3 This regional limitation has its
reasons. It is difficult to obtain comprehensive data on
executive compensation outside of the USA. Despite the
ubiquitously proclaimed use of RPE in practice, the empir-
ical results of the literature have been a mixed bag.4 This
is partly owed to the fact that the post hoc construction of
peer groups is fraught with issues. If researchers identify a
different peer group than the target firm itself had actually
used, inferences on RPE are no longer meaningful. Cor-
rect identification is one reason why one may fail to find
evidence of RPE. A simpler explanation would be that the
RPE claims are merely empty rhetoric to appease stake-
holders. As Albuquerque (2009) puts it, any empirical
tests of RPE are, in this sense, joint tests.
This paper embraces this duality and tests for RPE in
a new sample of large and globally operating non-U.S.
banks.5 We contend that the global banking industry is
an ideal playground to test the usage of RPE, for at least
three reasons. First, RPE makes especially sense for firms
that are exposed to common shocks. This applies partic-
ularly well to international banking. The main reason for
this exposure is that banks are highly leveraged institu-
tions. Around 90 percent of their assets come from debt,
making them more prone to exogenous volatility (Hous-
ton and James 1995; Chen et al. 2006). Second, the barriers
to global integration in the banking industry have been
significantly trimmed in the last two decades, shifting
banks from once centralized domestic organizations to
global behemoths. In turn, the structure of competition in
the industry has adjusted (Berger and Smith 2003). Large
banks operating on the international level are now deal-
ing with intense competition.6 Third, the recent financial
crisis was characterized by failures of large international
banks such as Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers. The
downfall of these banks has drawn increasing attention to
corporate governance issues in remuneration policy.7 If
anything, this pressure has prompted banks to make more
efficient use of RPE.
Our study tackles the caveat that the soundness of
empirical tests on RPE critically hinges on the correct
identification of the peer groups. We follow the semi-
nal approach by Albuquerque (2009) and aggregate peer
performance on the basis of industry and industry/size
peer groups. Aggregating in this manner accounts for
the observation that industry affiliation and firm size are
informative proxies for the common market risks that
RPE-setting firms face. In doing so, this approach takes
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up Holmstrom’s (1979) theoretical requirement of com-
mon uncertainties. Our study also deals with the potential
issue of RPE being corporate window dressing, with the
firm not actually engaging in RPE. If that were the case
then signaling the disclosure of peer group usage would
be mere noise, and incorporating this information should
not alter our results qualitatively. To test this hypothesis,
we differentiate between disclosing and non-disclosing
banks. Disclosing banks claim to compare their execu-
tive’s performance relative to peer group performance in
determining one or several components of executive pay.8
We collect a new data set with information on 46 large
international banks. The results of our basic regression
specification document negative and insignificant param-
eter estimates in industry peers. Taken by itself, this casts
doubt on the use of RPE in our sample. When we perform
tests of RPE on industry/size peers, we find moderate
evidence consistent with RPE. In restricting attention to
the subsample of disclosing banks, we find stronger and
more conclusive evidence that systematic risk is filtered
out from CEO compensation. Strong-form RPE tests sup-
port this conclusion. This result stands in contrast to
Gong et al. (2011), who do not find informational value in
RPE disclosure among US. firms.9 To gain more insight,
we disentangle potential factors related to RPE usage.
A logistic regression indicates that firm size, and, to a
smaller extent, growth options are associated with RPE
usage. The results imply that the greater a bank is, the
higher is the probability that it will use RPE in its com-
pensation contracts. On the other hand, the probability
of using RPE decreases with the magnitude of growth
options.
Our paper contributes to the ongoing discussion on RPE
along several dimensions. Existing studies testing RPE
on banks have focused solely on US data. This is hard
to square with an industry that is characterized by pro-
nounced international competition. We provide broader
evidence by conducting tests on a newly collected sample
of large international banks. We also shed new light on
the informative value of disclosure. Our results withstand
several robustness tests and suggest that the banks in our
sample which proclaim the use of peers in assessing the
performance of their CEOs are not merely window dress-
ing: we do find stronger evidence for RPE usage among
disclosing banks. This indicates that lumping together dis-
closing and non-disclosing firms can be detrimental to the
conclusiveness of RPE tests. Finally, we examine the asso-
ciation of several bank characteristics with the intensity of
RPE usage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
the “Relative performance evaluation and the banking
industry” section we describe the main characteristics of
the banking industry. This section also introduces the
empirical model and depicts the peer group construction
mechanism. The “Data description” section presents our
novel data set of international banks. The “Results”
section reports summary statistics and regression results.
In the “Extensions and robustness checks” section, we
explore factors related to RPE, investigate the associa-
tion of RPE pay practices with bank-level characteristics,
and conduct several robustness checks. The last section
concludes.
2 Relative performance evaluation and the
banking industry
2.1 Executive pay in the banking industry
The literature on executive compensation in banking
attends to the particularities of the industry. There are
three characteristic features of banks (John andQian 2003;
Macey and O’Hara 2003; Tung 2011). First, banks have
a peculiar capital structure. They hold much less equity
than other companies, rendering them highly leveraged.
Roughly 90% of a bank’s funds comes from debt. In addi-
tion, a bank’s assets and liabilities are mismatched (Dia-
mond and Dybvig 1983). Second, the presence of federal
guarantees of bank deposits, a public measure to protect
private depositors from losses in case of insolvency, dis-
tinguishes banks from other firms. Third, these deposits
can increase the risk of fraud and self-dealing in the bank-
ing industry by reducing the incentives for monitoring
(Macey and O’Hara 2003).
Against this background, the literature addresses three
main topics (Houston and James 1995). One cluster of
studies examines whether the sensitivity of executive
compensation to a bank’s performance was affected by
the US corporate control market deregulation (Craw-
ford et al. 1995; Hubbard and Palia 1995; Cuñat and
Guadalupe 2009)10. Two other studies test whether the
existing compensation policies promote risk-taking in the
US banking sector by examining the relation between
the specific component of the compensation and market
measures of risk (Houston and James 1995; Chen et al.
2006).11 Other research examines the usage of RPE in the
US banking industry. Barro and Barro (1990) test RPE
on a data set that covers 83 commercial banks in the US
between 1982 and 1987. They regress the growth rate of
real compensation on the average of the real total rate of
return from the current and previous period, the first dif-
ference of accounting-based returns, regional averages for
both accounting-based return, and the average of the real
total rate of return. This effectively compares the perfor-
mance of banks relative to the performance of other banks
in the same region. Their evidence is not consistent with
the use of RPE. Crawford (1999) tests two hypotheses on
215 executives from 118 US commercial banks from 1976
to 1988. He regresses change in CEO pay for a specific
bank on a change in shareholder wealth for that bank,
an industry relative performance measure, and a market
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performance measure using S&P 500 returns. His findings
suggest that relative compensation is negatively related
to market and industry returns and positively related to
shareholder returns. In addition, in his sample, the use
of RPE increases upon introduction of banking deregu-
lation. Crawford reports evidence consistent with RPE if
CEO compensation is evaluated relative to industry peers.
He does not, however, find evidence of RPE when using
market performance measures.
The literature also provides insight about the remuner-
ation practice in the banking industry. The data show that
bank CEOs receive less cash compensation on average,
are less likely to participate in a stock option plan, and
hold fewer growth options than CEOs in other industries.
These differences are likely to stem from banks’ different
investment opportunities (Houston and James 1995). But
not all is different in the banking industry. Houston and
James do not find any differences between banking and
non-banking industries regarding the overall sensitivity of
pay to performance. They presume that the factors that
influence compensation in the banking industry are simi-
lar to those in non-banking industries despite differences
in the compensation structure. Adams andMehran (2003)
suggest that the difference in the governance structures
between manufacturing firms and banks are industry-
specific. Furthermore, the differences seem to be mostly
due to different investment opportunities of bank holding
companies (BHCs) and pertinent regulation. Adams and
Mehran’s study examines whether firm performance mea-
sures are influenced by the governance structure. Their
results indicate that differences between the board struc-
tures of manufacturing firms and banks might not be
a reason for concern in this respect. Aebi et al. (2012)
study the strength of incentive features of top manage-
ment compensation contracts in banks. They compare
the pay-performance sensitivity in banks with those in
manufacturing firms and show that debt ratio, firm size,
risk, and regulation are important determinants of pay-
performance sensitivity in banks. Finally, the executive
compensation structure and the governance structure of
banks differ from firms in other industries. Even so, the
factors that influence the overall pay-performance sensi-
tivity do not seem to differ significantly across industries.
2.2 Empirical model
To test for RPE, we employ a model that is based on
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987). Specifically, we use the
following weak-form test of RPE:12
Compit =α0 + α1 · FirmPerfit
+ α2 · PeerPerf it + α3 · Cit + it . (1)
Compit measures executive compensation in monetary
terms, FirmPerf it stands for the performance of firm i
measured as the continuously compounded gross real rate
of return to shareholders (assuming that dividends are
reinvested), and PeerPerf it denotes the performance of
firm i′s peer group. To account for variation not included
in firm i′s and its peer group’s performance we include
several control variables, subsumed in the column vector
Cit . These variables include firm size and growth options.
In addition, we include time, industry, and country dum-
mies. The subscript t denotes the respective year and
it represents an independent firm-specific white noise
process. α0, α1, α2, and α3 denote model parameters.13
In this model, rejecting the null hypothesis H0 : α2 ≥ 0
against the one-sided alternativeH1 : α2 < 0 provides evi-
dence of RPE in executive compensation contracts. In that
case, exogenous shocks outside of the control of the exec-
utive management are filtered out from the compensation
contract.
Researchers typically use the so-called strong-from RPE
test to examine whether all exogenous shocks are removed
from the compensation contract. The first step in con-
ducting this test is to regress firm performance on peer
performance (Antle and Smith 1986). The first step
regression model is
FirmPerf it =γi + βi · PeerPerf it
+ ηi · Cit + εit . (2)
The unsystematic and systematic performance are
obtained from the equation above in the following
manner:
UnsysFirmPerf it = η̂i · Cit + ε̂it ,
SysFirmPerf it = γ̂i + ̂βi · PeerPerf it .
(3)
̂it denotes regression residuals and γ̂i, ̂βi denote param-
eter estimates.14 The second step estimates the sensitivity
of CEO compensation with respect to the unsystematic
and systematic components of firm performance, that is:
Compit = δ0 + δ1 · UnsysFirmPerfit
+ δ2 · SystFirmPerfit + δ3 · Cit + eit . (4)
Cit denotes a column vector of control variables and the
row vector δ3 its coefficients. If the systematic risk is
filtered out from the compensation contract, the system-
atic performance δ2 in Eq. (4) should not be significantly
different from zero.
3 Data description
This section describes the data preparation process. The
“Compensation data” subsection reports the collection of
the international compensation data, the “International
banking sample” subsection provides details about the
sample of international banks that we use in the regression
analysis, and the “Peer group composition” subsection
documents the peer group data selection process.
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3.1 Compensation data
There is no standardized database for international cor-
porate executive compensation. We collect our data from
several sources for the years 2003–2014. Financial and
accounting data are obtained from Thomson Reuters
Datastream and Thomson Reuters Worldscope. Compen-
sation data are collected manually either from annual
reports or management proxy circulars available online.
We do not include US banks in our analysis. In August
2006, a new regulatory requirement by the US Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission mandated, among other
things, full disclosure of peer group compositions (if appli-
cable) for fiscal years ending on or after December 15,
2006. In a recent study, Faulkender and Yang (2013) pro-
vide evidence that this event generated a structural break
in the peer group selection, discouraging the use of US
compensation data for our purpose.15 For the other coun-
tries in our sample, we could not find any corresponding
regulation that was introduced in our observed time-
frame.16
Our initial data set is composed of firms classified as
banks from the FTSE All World Index with an index
weight higher than 0.02. This yields 75 firms. Based on
this list, we collect remuneration data for 46 different
firms with a total of 335 firm-year observations (hence-
forth dubbed the “full sample”). A detailed list of all banks
in our sample is shown in Table 12 in the Appendix. In
addition, we list all non-US global systemically important
banks (G-SIBs) from 2011 to 2012, indicating the inclu-
sion in our sample or stating the reason for exclusion (see
Table 13 in the Appendix).
In line with the source information, we quantify the
compensation in nominal terms. As CEO compensation,
we define the compensation paid by the parent company
as well as the one paid by subsidiaries (for the CEO posi-
tion). In rare cases, firms only provide a certain wage
range. In that case, we always include the higher bound as
the actual compensation. We do not include the measure
of CEO compensation changes in the value of existing firm
options and stock holdings owned by the CEO.
In order to collect the total compensation data, we
focus on the amount the firm itself defines as the
“total.” This always includes all the positions used for
the fixed compensation amount as well as performance-
related components. The name and the exact composi-
tion of these performance-related components vary sig-
nificantly between firms. For example, some firms dif-
ferentiate between long-term and short-term incentives,
whereas others just talk about bonuses. This seems to
be related to the pertaining country and its national
regulations. We ignore any extraordinary compensation
such as restricted shares (which had been allocated when
starting as CEO), payment in lieu of notice, or buy-
out. Finally, we exclude all amounts received related to
the holding of a director position in addition to the
CEO position.
We also collect information to create a dummy variable
that indicates explicit disclosure of peer firms in deter-
mining a company’s relative performance pay to its CEO.
We translate such disclosures as indication of RPE usage
and examine the subsample of thusly disclosing firms in
the “Regression results” section. We then identify possi-
ble factors related to this disclosure in the “Extensions and
robustness checks” section. Note that this approach is less
excluding than a strict requirement of overt RPE claims,
and would therefore also pick up simple benchmarking
(for details on the difference between RPE and bench-
marking, see Gong et al. (2011)). This runs a higher risk of
not rejecting the null hypothesis even if it is false. If we do
find evidence against the null hypothesis, however, we can
be quite confident that disclosure has a significant impact.
3.2 International banking sample
We convert all compensation data into US Dollars by
using exchange rates from Thomson Reuters Datastream.
The exchange rate is determined by the day after the end
of the fiscal year (e.g., if the fiscal year ends on Decem-
ber 31, 2010, we take the exchange rate on January 1,
2011). We measure firm performance with stock market
return data fromThomson Reuters Datastream. Following
the literature, we control for firm size (sales) (Smith and
Watts 1992; Fama and French 1992) and growth oppor-
tunities (Fama and French 1992). In addition, we include
dummies to control for year-specific differences in the
level of compensation, industry dummies that capture
unobservable variation at the industry level, and coun-
try dummies that capture any country-specific variation
(e.g., due to different regulations or legal directives). In
order to control for this possible country-specific hetero-
geneity, we only keep banks from countries with at least
two observations.
Panel A of Table 1 shows the frequencies for the full
sample, the RPE disclosure subsample, and the non-RPE
disclosure subsamples for each year. Altogether, the data
for the full sample are evenly distributed over the years
2004–2013, though the frequency of the data tends to
increase somewhat over time.17 The same applies for both
subsamples.
Panel B of Table 1 displays the sample frequency by
industry group within the banking industry. In addi-
tion, it reports the frequency of RPE disclosing and
non-disclosing banks by industry group. Subsector 6029
(Commercial Banks) dominates the full sample with more
than 80% of all observations. The other subsectors are
National Commercial Banks (6021), State Commercial
Banks (6022), Federal Saving Institutions (6035), and
Security Brokers and Dealers (6211). Similar to the full
sample results, RPE disclosing (84.57%) and non-RPE
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Table 1 Sample frequency by year, SIC level, and country
Full sample RPE subsample Non-RPE subsample
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Panel A: sample frequency by year
Year
2004 14 4.18 7 4.32 7 4.05
2005 22 6.57 10 6.17 12 6.94
2006 27 8.06 14 8.64 13 7.51
2007 33 9.85 17 10.49 16 9.25
2008 35 10.45 17 10.49 18 10.40
2009 41 12.24 18 11.11 23 13.29
2010 42 12.54 18 11.11 24 13.87
2011 45 13.43 21 12.96 24 13.87
2012 45 13.43 22 13.58 23 13.29
2013 31 9.25 18 11.11 13 7.51
Panel B: sample frequency by SIC level
SIC level
6021 23 6.87 7 4.32 16 9.25
6022 8 2.39 8 4.94 0 0.00
6029 287 85.67 137 84.57 150 86.71
6035 10 2.99 3 1.85 7 4.05
6211 7 2.09 7 4.32 0 0.00
Panel C: sample frequency by country
Country
Australia 30 8.96 30 18.52 0 0.00
Canada 52 15.52 45 27.78 7 4.05
China 21 6.27 0 0.00 21 12.14
France 24 7.16 10 6.17 14 8.09
Germany 19 5.67 19 11.73 0 0.00
Hong Kong 9 2.69 0 0.00 9 5.20
Italy 6 1.79 6 3.70 0 0.00
Japan 6 1.79 0 0.00 6 3.47
Malaysia 19 5.67 2 1.23 17 9.83
Norway 10 2.99 0 0.00 10 5.78
Singapore 30 8.96 2 1.23 28 16.18
South Africa 14 4.18 6 3.70 8 4.62
Spain 20 5.97 5 3.09 15 8.67
Sweden 33 9.85 17 10.49 16 9.25
Switzerland 13 3.88 7 4.32 6 3.47
UK 29 8.66 13 8.02 16 9.25
Note: Panel A shows the sample frequency by year for the full sample, for the sample of RPE disclosing banks (RPE subsample), and for the subsample of non-disclosing banks
(non-RPE subsample). We report the year, the frequency of the sample observation for each year, and the yearly percentage of the sample. Panel B shows the sample
frequency by SIC level for the full sample, for the RPE subsample, and for the non-RPE subsample. We report the SIC level, the frequency of the sample observation for each
SIC level, and the SIC percentage of the sample. Panel C shows the sample frequency by country for the full sample, for the RPE subsample, and for the non-RPE subsample.
We report the country, the frequency of the sample observation for each country, and the country percentage of the overall sample
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disclosing banks (86.71%) mostly belong to the subsector
6029 (Commercial Banks). All the banks belonging to the
subsector 6022 (State Commercial Banks) and the subsec-
tor 6035 (Federal Saving Institutions) disclose their peer
groups.
Panel C of Table 1 depicts the sample frequency by
country, including the RPE and non-RPE subsamples.
Among the 14 countries in the full sample, Canada,
Australia, Singapore, Sweden, and the UK provide the
largest shares of our observations. The banks in Canada,
Australia, and Germany have the highest propensi-
ties of RPE disclosure. In Australia and Germany, all
banks provide information about their peer groups,
whereas none of the banks in Hong Kong, China, and
Norway do so.
Table 2 shows Pearson correlation coefficients between
performance measures and the control variables firm
size and growth options. Firm stock return and indus-
try peer return as well as firm stock return and indus-
try/size peer return display positive correlations. The
correlation of firm stock return with its industry peer
return (0.73) is lower than the correlation of firm
stock return with its industry/size peer return (0.79),
which is consistent with previous evidence (Albuquerque
2009).18 The statistically significant correlation coeffi-
cients increase our confidence that industry and indus-
try/size peers are suited for filtering out noise from
firm performance measures. In addition, total executive
compensation is positively and significantly correlated
with stock return (0.15). The same holds for the cor-
relation between total compensation and industry peer
return, and total compensation and industry/size peer
return. Not surprisingly, total compensation is positively
correlated with firm size. In order to identify a possi-
ble multicollinearity problem in the upcoming regres-
sions, we report variance inflation factors in all respective
tables.19
3.3 Peer group composition
For the selection of the peer firm pool, we start with a
comprehensive list of 4,228 firms, most of which are finan-
cials. We use SIC-codes to remove firms which do not
belong to the banking industry.20 We also exclude other
firms which we do not consider valid peers, such as the
Allied Irish Banks, which technically became state-owned
during the financial crisis. We then apply a number of
screens to the return data to obtain a qualitatively sound
data set (Ince and Porter 2006). First, we delete any con-
secutive zero returns at the end of the sample period. Sec-
ond, we remove returns below− 80% and above 300%.We
also require that the one-year continuously compounded
return obtained frommonthly data is available.We end up
with 1,570 firms as the pool of potential peers. Note that
in order to mitigate survivorship bias, this pool also con-
tains so-called “dead stocks” which were delisted from the
stock market during the sample period.
RPE firms assess their CEOs’ compensation levels based
on performance in relation to their respective peers.
These peers are not simply a random draw of the mar-
ket; firms follow a specific methodology in selecting
their peers. Because researchers usually do not know a
firm’s peers, a different approach is needed to approxi-
mate the peer group. Most studies assessing RPE employ
broad industry or market indices as a comparison group
for peer performance. This is not without problems.
Firms within an industry are hardly homogenous in
their characteristics, so simple benchmarks are not able
to adequately capture common shocks (Albuquerque
2009).21 This introduces a bias in the statistical estimation
and can distort inferences. An inappropriate compari-
son group can lead to a higher (or lower) prescribed
level of CEO pay. An expedient and replicable compari-
son group based on a reasonable and objective criterion
is therefore the key element when empirically testing
for RPE.
Table 2 Pearson correlation coefficients
Firm stock return Industry peer return Industry/size peer return Log(sales) Log(assets) Growth options Total compensation
Firm stock return 1.00
Industry peer
return
0.73*** 1.00
Industry/size
peer return
0.79*** 0.96*** 1.00
Log(sales) − 0.19*** − 0.09* − 0.08 1.00
Log(assets) − 0.18*** − 0.09 − 0.06 0.96*** 1.00
Growth options 0.41*** 0.26*** 0.25*** − 0.49*** − 0.57*** 1.00
Total
compensation
0.15*** 0.12** 0.12** 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.03 1.00
Note: This table shows Pearson product moment correlation coefficients between total compensation, performance measures, and control variables. The sample consists of
335 observations covering the time period 2004–2013. Significance levels are denoted as follows: 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*)
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Albuquerque (2009) provides a pragmatic solution for
the ex post reconstruction of RPE peer groups. She com-
poses groups based on both the two-digit SIC level and
firm size. The first step in her process sorts firms by
beginning-of-year market value into size quartiles within
an industry. This yields four peer groups per industry.
Each firm is then matched with its industry-size peer
group. It turns out that this approach yields stronger
empirical support for the use of RPE in executive com-
pensation than sorting by industry classification alone,
an improvement that is due to the information that firm
size captures. Firms of comparable size are similar along
several other characteristics which proxy for systematic
risk. Albuquerque shows how the levels of diversifica-
tion, financing constraints, and operating leverage vary
with industry-size-ranked portfolios and provides evi-
dence that firm size subsumes these characteristics. She
finds that larger firms tend to be more diversified, have
greater operating leverage, and smaller financing con-
straints. This claim is supported by other literature. Dem-
setz and Strahan (1997), for instance, construct a measure
of diversification of BHCs. Their results establish a strong,
positive effect of bank size on the diversification of BHCs.
Moreover, small firms tend to face bigger financial con-
straints in comparison to large ones. In other words, firm
size is a proxy with high explanatory power for the com-
mon uncertainty Holmstrom (1982) insinuated. We thus
proceed to build the specific peer groups by adapting the
industry/size approach by Albuquerque (2009).
4 Results
4.1 Full sample results
This subsection presents the results for our full
banking sample. We first present descriptive statistics of
compensation data, performance measures, and firm
characteristics for the 46 firms during 2004–2013
(see the “Summary statistics” subsection). In the
“Regression results” section, we then document the sta-
tistical results. We regress the logarithm of total CEO
compensation on firm stock performance, peer return,
and several control variables.
4.1.1 Summary statistics
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample.
We report two measures of compensation: total compen-
sation and the logarithm of total compensation. In the
regression analysis, we use the logarithm of total com-
pensation as a dependent variable because its empirical
distribution is more symmetrical than the one for total
compensation. This mitigates heteroscedasticity as well
as extreme skewness and allows for a direct compari-
son with results from previous studies (Murphy 1999).
We also report summary statistics for the control vari-
ables firm size (log of sales and sales) and growth options.
Table 3 shows that the average (median) total compen-
sation of an executive in our sample is USD 5.28 million
(USD 4.12 million), which is not all that surprising in a
sample that largely consists of major global players in the
banking industry. Firm performance is measured using
log-returns. The mean firm stock return is 5% and the
median return is 14%. Averages of peer returns hover
around 8%. The average (median) size in terms of sales
of a bank is USD 34.15 billion (USD 20.63 billion). Using
total assets as a proxy for size, the according value is USD
738.47 billion (USD 376.83 billion).
4.1.2 Regression results
We test the use of RPE in CEO compensation using Eq. 1.
Peer groups are constructed with the industry and indus-
try/size approach. We regress the logarithm of total CEO
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean St. dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Total compensation 335 5.28 4.05 0.13 1.90 4.12 8.30 20.40
Log(total compensation) 335 1.29 0.99 − 2.02 0.64 1.42 2.12 3.02
Firm stock return 335 0.05 0.43 − 1.59 − 0.08 0.14 0.29 1.24
Peer return (industry) 335 0.09 0.26 − 0.72 − 0.12 0.15 0.25 0.86
Peer return (industry/size) 335 0.08 0.32 − 0.83 − 0.07 0.16 0.27 0.82
Firm size (sales) 335 34.15 33.03 1.01 7.94 20.63 53.10 142.75
Firm size (log(sales)) 335 2.99 1.12 0.01 2.07 3.03 3.97 4.96
Firm size (assets) 335 738.47 764.38 27.04 166.18 376.83 1106.20 3069.54
Firm size (log(assets)) 335 6.02 1.15 3.30 5.11 5.93 7.01 8.03
Growth options 335 1.04 0.05 0.95 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.19
Firm stock return variance 330 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.20 1.10
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics of the compensation data, firm performance measures, and control variables. Specifically, we document firm stock return and
peer return. Summary statistics for peer groups are based on an industry affiliation and an industry/size quartiles approach. We report the number of firm observations (N),
mean (Mean), minimum (Min), standard deviation (St.dev.), 25th percentile (Q1), median (Median), 75th percentile (Q3), and maximum (Max) for the time span 2004–2013.
Total compensation is in million USD; sales and total assets are in billion USD
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compensation on firm stock return, peer return, growth
options, and log of sales. Year, country, and industry
dummies are also included.
Panel A of Table 4 shows the sensitivity of CEO total
compensation to RPE when using industry and indus-
try/size peer groups. The coefficient on firm stock return
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level
for both peer group specifications, with values of 0.47
and 0.55 for the industry and industry/size specifications,
respectively. When the peer group is restricted to firms
within the same industry, the coefficient of the peer port-
folio is negative but not significant (− 0.11 with a p value
of 0.56). Put differently, the performance of these peers
does not seem to be filtered out from the CEO compen-
sation contracts. If we include size into sorting and con-
sider industry/size peers, the parameter estimates become
statistically significant (with a coefficient of− 0.32 and a p
value of 0.05). Robustness checks yield mixed results.22 23
By and large, the results for our international banks
match previous findings for US firms, which showed that
industry/size peers are better able to capture exogenous
shocks than industry peers alone (Albuquerque 2009).
4.2 RPE subsample results
4.2.1 Weak tests of RPE
The results above are consistent with the notion that
the 46 banks in our full sample follow an RPE scheme.
We now turn to the informational value of peer disclo-
sure. Although there is a risk of taking disclosure at face
value, we exploit this information to sharpen our sam-
ple’s profile. We test the sensitivity of CEO pay to RPE in
the subsample of 25 banks that explicitly declare the use
Table 4 Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE
Panel A: weak-form RPE tests Panel B: weak-form RPE tests Panel C: strong-form RPE tests
– Full sample – Disclosure subsample – Disclosure subsample
Independent variables Industry peer group Industry/size peer group Industry peer group Industry/size peer group Industry/size peer group
Intercept 4.03** 4.13* − 3.55 − 2.88 − 5.64
(0.02) (0.08) (0.31) (0.40) (0.13)
Firm stock return 0.47*** 0.55*** 0.49** 0.69***
(0.00) [3.74] (0.00) [4.03] (0.01) [4.28] (0.00) [5.21]
Peer return (industry) − 0.11 − 0.30
(0.56) [4.15] (0.40) [5.07]
Peer return (industry/size) − 0.32** − 0.66**
(0.05) [4.70] (0.02) [5.30]
Unsystematic firm perf 0.69***
(0.00) [1.85]
Systematic firm perf 0.03
(0.89) [2.87]
Firm size (sales) 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.67***
(0.00) [4.05] (0.00) [4.04] (0.00) [5.07] (0.00) [5.08] (0.00) [5.08]
Growth options − 1.19 − 1.27 0.56 0.22 0.22
(0.35) [4.53] (0.32) [4.54] (0.95) [13.43] (0.94) [13.45] (0.94) [13.45]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 79.14% 79.36% 63.27% 64.52% 64.52%
Number of observations 335 335 162 162 162
Note: Panels A and B show OLS regression results for the equation Compit = α0 + α1 · FirmPerf it + α2 · PeerPerf it + α3 · Cit + it . The first and third column show the results
from regressing log of total CEO compensation on stock return, peer performance composed of the firms within the same industry, and control variables. The second and
fourth column document regression results based on the industry/size quartiles peer group approach by Albuquerque (2009). Panel A shows the results for the full sample,
and panel B reports the results for the disclosure subsample. Panel C documents OLS regression results for the equation Compit = δ0 + δ1 · UnsysFirmPerformanceit
+δ2 · SystFirmPerformanceit + δ3 · Cit + eit on the subsample of disclosing banks. We regress the logarithm of CEO compensation on the unsystematic firm performance,
systematic firm performance, and control variables for 162 firm-year observations over the time span 2004–2013. We use the industry/size peer group specification in order to
construct a systematic performance variable. All regressions include year, industry, and country dummies. For more details on systematic and unsystematic variable
construction, see the section “Empirical model”. Significance levels are two-sided and denoted as follows: 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗), and 10% (∗). The corresponding p values are
reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Variance inflation factors are reported in squared brackets
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of peers in determining the performance of their CEOs
in their statement proxies (see the “Compensation data”
section). We follow the same empirical specification used
in the previous analysis.
Panel B of Table 4 shows the sensitivity of CEO total
compensation to RPE when using industry and indus-
try/size peers. The results show positive and statistically
significant parameter estimates on firm stock perfor-
mance for both peer group specifications. The estimates
are 0.49 and 0.69, respectively, indicating that a CEO is
being rewarded for positive firm performance. Hence, on
average, CEO compensation increases with firm perfor-
mance. When the peer groups are composed of banks
within the same industry, the coefficient on the peer port-
folio is negative and not significant (with a coefficient of
− 0.30 and a p value of 0.40). The industry/size parame-
ter estimate is also negative but statistically significant at
the 5% level (with a coefficient of − 0.66 and a p value of
0.02). The results for the subsample of disclosing banks,
too, provide evidence consistent with RPE, but more con-
clusively so than the results for the full sample. The coef-
ficient on the peer portfolio doubles in size and increases
in statistical significance.24 This suggests that peer group
disclosure holds informational value regarding RPE. One
could also say that the inclusion of non-disclosing banks in
the full sample tends to dilute the statistical inference and
renders it less conclusive.25 These results stand in contrast
to Gong et al. (2011), who find no informational value of
RPE disclosure. However, their sample only comprises US
firms for 1 year.
4.2.2 Strong-form test of RPE
Following Antle and Smith (1986), we perform so-called
strong-form tests of RPE on the subsample of RPE disclo-
sures to verify the robustness of our results. Strong-form
tests of RPE examine whether all the noise that can be
removed is indeed filtered out from the compensation
contracts. Details on the construction of systematic and
unsystematic firm performances and the employed empir-
ical model are reported in the “Empirical model” subsec-
tion. In a nutshell, the results are consistent with RPE if
only the unsystematic performance exerts influence on
CEO pay, and not the systematic one.
Panel C of Table 4 documents the regression results
from Eq. (4) for the subsample of disclosing banks. Here,
we regress the logarithm of CEO compensation on unsys-
tematic firm performance, systematic firm performance,
and control variables for 162 firm-year observations over
the time span 2004–2013. In that specification, we restrict
ourselves to industry/size groups for constructing the sys-
tematic performance variable. The systematic component
is not significant with a coefficient estimate of 0.03 (p
value = 0.89). The unsystematic performance variable, on
the other hand, is positive and statistically significant with
a coefficient of 0.69 (p value = 0.00). This suggests that the
CEOs in our subsample are being compensated for unsys-
tematic performance only. These results hold up to several
robustness tests and provide evidence in keeping with the
use of strong-form RPE and reinforce the previous find-
ing that CEOs are not being compensated for systematic
performance in the subsample of RPE disclosures.26
5 Extensions and robustness checks
5.1 Associated factors of RPE in the banking industry
Prior studies have put forth a variety of factors that are
related to the usage of RPE in compensation contracts in
UK and US firms (Carter et al. 2009; Gong et al. 2011;
Albuquerque 2014). They do not, however, examine the
relation of one factor at a time on the usage of RPE while
controlling for other factors. Gong et al. (2011) investigate
explicit disclosures on RPE in the US to identify the fac-
tors that prompt the use of RPE in compensation contracts
in 2006. Carter et al. (2009) examine the use of RPE in
performance-vested equity grants in a sample of UK firms
in 2002. This section examines international firms over a
longer time span. Understanding what factors are linked
to RPE is instructive for researchers testing for RPE and
could offer yet another reason for the mixed evidence in
existing empirical studies.
In order to pinpoint possible factors related to RPE, we
conduct a logit regression. The dependent variable yit is
an indicator variable that equals 1 for banks that disclose
information on the use of a peer group to determine
the level of executive compensation, and 0 otherwise
(see the “Compensation data” section). The independent
variables include CEO pay (Compit), firm performance
(FirmPerf it), various specifications of peer return
(PeerPerf it), and control variables. We control for firm
size (FirmSizeit) and growth options (GrowthOptionsit)
and include year (YearDummyit), industry
(IndustryDummyit), and country (CountryDummyit)
dummies to control for cross-sectional variation.
Sales are used as a proxy for firm size. Growth
options are calculated as follows: (Market Equity+
Total Assets − Common Equity)/Total Assets.
Our logit model is based on the following latent variable
model:
yit = γ0 + γ1 · Compit + γ2 · FirmPerf it
+ γ3 · PeerPerf it + γ4 · FirmSizeit
+ γ5 · GrowthOptionsit + γ7 · YearDummyit
+ γ8 · IndustryDummyit
+ γ9 · CountryDummyit + uit . (5)
We estimate Eq. (5) with the full sample of 335 firm-
year observations from 2004 to 2013. Table 5 reports the
results. We find that the likelihood of using RPE is posi-
tively related to firm size and negatively related to growth
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Table 5 Logit regression of RPE usage in executive
compensation contracts
Independent variables Industry peer group Industry/size peer
group
Intercept − 25.31 − 25.37
(0.13) (0.13)
Compensation 0.48 0.47
(0.37) (0.38)
Firm perf 0.01 − 0.24
(0.99) (0.78)
Peer return (industry) 0.08
(0.96)
Peer return (industry/size) 0.79
(0.55)
Firm size (sales) 2.71*** 2.70***
(0.00) (0.00)
Growth options − 19.90* − 19.82*
(0.09) (0.10)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes
R2 52.56% 52.62%
Number of observations 335 335
Note: This Table documents logit regression results for the equation
yit = γ0 + γ1 · Compit + γ2 · FirmPerf it + γ3 · PeerPerf it + γ4 · Cit + uit . The
dependent variable is RPE, an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the firm
discloses peer group use in the compensation contracts. We regress RPE on firm
performance, peer returns, firm size, and growth options for 335 firm-year
observations over the time span 2004–2013. We also include year, country, and
industry dummies in the regression estimation for two specifications, industry and
industry/size peers. We report Cox and Snell’s R2 and model coefficient estimates.
Significance levels are denoted as follows: 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗), and 10% (∗). The
corresponding p values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate
options for industry and industry/size peers.27 The oppo-
site holds for growth options.28 None of the other pre-
dictors are statistically significant, indicating that in our
sample there is a strong link between size and growth
options on the one hand and RPE on the other one.29
These results are in line with existing evidence. Gong
et al. (2011) find that larger firms are more likely to use
RPE. This could be for several reasons. Firm size might
represent a crude proxy for public scrutiny and share-
holder concerns about compensation practices. Larger
firms are also more exposed to monitoring pressure
compared to smaller firms. This might well force them
to be more committed to RPE (Bannister and Newman
2003). Albuquerque (2014) and Gong et al. (2011) find
that the level of RPE in CEO compensation contracts is
negatively associated with a firm’s level of growth options.
Carter et al. (2009) examine the disclosure of
performance-based conditions in equity grants and
document that growth options are inversely related
to the performance-based conditions. Albuquerque
(2014) argues that high growth options firms have to
bear more risks and thus exhibit a higher idiosyncratic
variance. These firms are also characterized by firm-
specific know-how and operate in markets with high
barriers to entry. As a consequence, these characteristics
make peer performance uninformative with respect
to capturing external shocks. This eventually leads to
less usage of RPE among high growth options firms
(Albuquerque, 2014, p.1).
5.2 RPE pay practices and bank-level characteristics
We next extend our analysis and investigate the relation
between the magnitude of RPE pay practices and various
bank-level characteristics. We first repeat the standard
estimation (Eq. 1) conducted in the “Regression results”
section with the industry/size peer group. We quan-
tify RPE-intensity via the ratio of predicted (log) CEO-
compensation to the actual (log) CEO-compensation.
This prediction is only based on firm stock return and
peer group return. The idea here is to separate firms (or
firm-years) for which compensation is mainly based on
firm performance and peer group performance from firms
(or firm-years) for which other factors are more impor-
tant. We then proceed to sort all firm-years based on this
measure of RPE-intensity into four groups of equal size
to examine if various bank-level characteristics are related
to RPE-intensity. We analyze three different measures;
two proxies for firm performance and one proxy for firm-
specific risk: (1) return on equity (ROE), (2) the (yearly)
firm stock return, and (3) the variance of the firm stock
return. We calculate ROE by dividing net sales (Datas-
tream code DWSL) by lagged common equity (World-
scope itemWC03501). The calculation of the yearly stock
return is described in the “International banking sample”
section. Finally, firm stock return variance is calculated
as the variance of the stock returns over the previous 36
months.
The results are shown in Table 6. Between RPE-intensity
and ROE no clear relation can be made out. Returns
seem to decrease with RPE-intensity. This is a purely
descriptive exercise which cannot pinpoint any causal-
ity, so one could only speculate whether lower stock
returns lead to more RPE practices or whether less
RPE practices lead to higher stock returns (or whether
there is an unobservable characteristic driving both
of them). There is no monotonic relation between
stock return variance and RPE-intensity, but the cor-
relations show that firms with comparatively high
and low RPE-intensities have somewhat higher return
variances, suggesting that these firms are riskier. A
more detailed investigation on the mechanism behind
of these observations could be an area for future
research.
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Table 6 RPE pay practices and bank-level characteristics
RPE-intensity
group
N ROE Firm stock return Firm stock return
variance
1 83 1.21 0.05 0.16
(0.48) (0.42) (0.16)
2 84 1.13 0.12 0.13
(0.51) (0.30) (0.17)
3 84 1.04 0.07 0.12
(0.60) (0.40) (0.12)
4 84 1.24 -0.02 0.17
(0.65) (0.56) (0.19)
Note: Using RPE-intensity, we classify firm-year observations into four groups.
RPE-intensity is calculated as the ratio of predicted (log) CEO compensation to
actual (log) CEO compensation. The ratio of predicted to actual CEO compensation
is lowest in group 1 and highest in group 4. ROE is calculated by dividing net sales
(datastream code DWSL) by lagged common equity (worldscope item WC03501).
The calculation of the yearly stock return is based on the yearly total return index by
datastream based on the respective fiscal year. Firm stock return variance is
calculated as the variance of the stock returns over the previous 36 months. The
table reports group means for each measure. Standard deviations are shown in
parentheses
5.3 Robustness checks
In this section, we conduct three different checks to gauge
the robustness of the results obtained in the “Results”
section: (1) we construct regional instead of global peer
groups, (2) we construct value-weighted instead of equal-
weighted peer groups, and (3) we examine the effect of
excluding the years of the financial crisis (2007 and 2008).
5.3.1 Regional peer groups
Our first robustness check restricts the construction
of the peer group by employing regional instead of
global peer groups. We first classify seven regions as
defined by the World Bank:30 “Europe and Central
Asia," "Middle East and North Africa," "Latin America
and Caribbean," "East Asia and Pacific,” “South Asia,”
“Sub-Saharan Africa,” and “North America.” Not surpris-
ingly, the correlations between peer and firm stock returns
are somewhat higher with regional peer groups than with
global peer groups (as shown in Tables 7 and 2, respec-
tively). The correlation between industry peer group and
total compensation is no longer significant. The correla-
tion between industry/size peer group and total compen-
sation, on the other hand, does not change from going
regional.
Table 8 replicates the main results of the
“Regression results” section using regional peer groups.
By and large, the results are similar to the ones obtained
with global peer groups in the “Regression results”
section. The coefficients of the industry/size peer group
remain significant at the 5% level for both the full sample
and the disclosure subsample. The strong-form RPE test
for the disclosure subsample continues to support the
hypothesis that firms apply RPE.
5.3.2 Value-weighted peer groups
With a skewed distribution, equal weights might over-
state the influence of smaller banks in peer groups. This
is a concern in our sample because it contains the largest
banks in the world, possibly biasing our results. To mit-
igate the impact of smaller banks, the next robustness
check employs value-weighted instead of equal-weighted
peer groups. For this purpose, we use the market capital-
ization at the fiscal year date. Table 9 shows the according
correlations. The results do not change much compared
to equal-weighted peer groups as shown in Table 2.
Table 10 replicates the main results of the
“Regression results” section using value-weighted peer
groups. The differences between the industry and the
industry/size peer groups become less pronounced. This
is to be expected because value weights shift the focus
to the biggest firms in each industry, and the banks in
our sample are most likely in this group. Taken together,
we come to the same conclusions: the size/industry
Table 7 Pearson correlation coefficients with regional peer groups
Firm stock return Industry peer return Industry/size peer return Log(sales) Log(assets) Growth options Total compensation
Firm stock return 1.00
Industry peer
return
0.80*** 1.00
Industry/size
peer return
0.85*** 0.93*** 1.00
Log(sales) − 0.19*** − 0.12** − 0.13** 1.00
Log(assets) − 0.18*** − 0.13** − 0.12** 0.96*** 1.00
Growth options 0.41*** 0.30*** 0.30*** − 0.49*** − 0.57*** 1.00
Total
compensation
0.15*** 0.07 0.12** 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.03 1.00
Note: This table shows Pearson product moment correlation coefficients between total compensation, performance measures, and control variables. Peer groups are
constructed for seven different regions. The sample consists of 335 observations covering the time period 2004–2013. Significance levels are denoted as follows: 1% (***), 5%
(**), and 10% (*)
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Table 8 Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE with regional peer groups
Panel A: weak-form RPE tests Panel B: weak-form RPE tests Panel C: strong-form RPE tests
– Full sample – Disclosure subsample – Disclosure subsample
Independent variables Industry peer group Industry/size peer group Industry peer group Industry/size peer group Industry/size peer group
Intercept 2.08** 2.25* − 0.84 − 0.60 − 2.44
(0.02) (0.08) (0.78) (0.84) (0.42)
Firm stock return 0.47*** 0.60*** 0.55** 0.85***
(0.00) [4.39] (0.00) [4.68] (0.02) [6.17] (0.00) [7.22]
Peer
return(industry)
− 0.09 − 0.29
(0.59) [4.58] (0.37) [5.99]
Peer return
(industry/size)
− 0.31** − 0.66**
(0.04) [5.46] (0.02) [6.97]
Unsystematic
firm perf
0.85***
(0.00) [1.69]
Systematic firm
perf
0.09
(0.63) [2.72]
Firm size (sales) 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.70*** 0.65*** 0.65***
(0.00) [4.04] (0.00) [4.05] (0.00) [5.03] (0.00) [5.17] (0.00) [5.17]
Growth options − 1.12 − 1.37 0.48 0.33 0.33
(0.34) [4.57] (0.28) [4.56] (0.87) [13.48] (0.90) [13.42] (0.90) [13.42]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 79.14% 79.42% 63.28% 64.92% 64.92%
Number of
observations
335 335 162 162 162
Note: PanelS A and B show OLS regression results for the equation Compit = α0 + α1 · FirmPerf it + α2 · PeerPerf it + α3 · Cit + it . The first and third columns show the results
from regressing log of total CEO compensation on stock return, peer performance composed of the firms within the same industry, and control variables. The second and
fourth columns document regression results based on the industry/size quartiles peer group approach by Albuquerque (2009). Panel A shows the results for the full sample,
and panel B reports the results for the disclosure subsample. Panel C documents OLS regression results for the equation Compit = δ0 + δ1 · UnsysFirmPerformanceit
+δ2 · SystFirmPerformanceit + δ3 · Cit + eit on the subsample of disclosing banks. We regress logarithm of CEO compensation on the unsystematic firm performance,
systematic firm performance, and control variables for 162 firm-year observations over the time span 2004–2013. We use industry/size peer group specification in order to
construct a systematic performance variable. All regressions include year, industry, and country dummies. For more details on systematic and unsystematic variable
construction see the “Empirical model” section. Peer groups are constructed for seven different regions. Significance levels are two-sided and denoted as follows: 1% (∗ ∗ ∗),
5% (∗∗), and 10% (∗). The corresponding p values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Variance inflation factors are reported in squared brackets
peer group still performs better than the industry peer
group, and the strong-form RPE test for the disclosure
subsample continues to support the hypothesis that firms
apply RPE.
5.3.3 Exclusion of financial crisis years
The financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 had far-
reaching implications for the performance of banks
(e.g., Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011)). These crisis years
might distort the results of our analysis by driving the
correlation between firm performance and industry/size
peer return. In a third robustness check, we exclude the
years 2007 and 2008 from our sample.31
The correlations obtained without the years 2007 and
2008 strongly differ from the baseline results in Table 2
(see Table 16). While still significant, the correlations
between peer return and firm stock return become much
less pronounced. The correlations between total com-
pensation and peer return even turn negative, albeit not
statistically significantly.
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Table 9 Pearson correlation coefficients with value-weighted peer groups
Firm stock return Industry peer return Industry/size peer return Log(sales) Log(assets) Growth options Total compensation
Firm stock return 1.00
Industry peer
return
0.80*** 1.00
Industry/size
peer return
0.81*** 0.99*** 1.00
Log(sales) − 0.19*** − 0.08 − 0.08 1.00
Log(assets) − 0.18*** − 0.06 − 0.06 0.96*** 1.00
Growth options 0.41*** 0.24*** 0.24*** − 0.49*** − 0.57*** 1.00
Total
compensation
0.15*** 0.10* 0.11** 0.30*** 0.27*** 0.03 1.00
Note: This table shows Pearson product moment correlation coefficients between total compensation, performance measures, and control variables. Peer groups are
constructed using value weights. The sample consists of 335 observations covering the time period 2004–2013. Significance levels are denoted as follows: 1% (***), 5% (**),
and 10% (*)
We next examine whether this substantial change in
correlations affect the main conclusions from our base-
line results. Table 11 shows that the peer group coef-
ficients become generally more negative. But the weak-
form regression paints the same picture as the baseline
results: Size/industry peer groups have larger coefficients
than industry-only peer groups, and the disclosure sub-
sample shows stronger evidence in favor of RPE than
the full sample. The strong-form regressions reject the
hypothesis that systematic risk is not filtered out of the
compensation contract at a 5% level of statistical signifi-
cance (instead of 10% in the other results).
5.3.4 Additional robustness checks
We performed additional, unreported robustness
checks.32 Using total assets instead of sales as a proxy
for firm size yields very similar results. Value-weighted
regional peer groups do not substantially alter the results
of the baseline specification, either. Finally, in order to
disentangle cross-sectional from time-series effects, we
conduct a panel estimation with fixed year-effects and
fixed bank-effects. The between-group estimates yield
mostly insignificant coefficients. The coefficient for the
disclosure subsample with the size/industry peer group,
however, is negative and significant (at the 5% level), and
thus in line with our baseline result.
6 Conclusion
This papers tests the presence of RPE in an original sample
of 46 international banks from 2004 to 2013. We regress
the logarithm of total compensation on firm performance,
industry and industry/size peer performance, and control
variables such as firm size and growth options.We control
for unobservable variation in the level of compensation
across years, industries, and countries. When we account
for peer groups with peer selection based on industry
and firm size, we find evidence for the use of RPE in
international banking. This evidence becomes stronger
once we focus on banks who openly disclose the
use of peers in their remuneration practice. This
insight contrasts and complements previous findings
for the US.
We next employ a logit regression model to identify fac-
tors related to RPE in international banking. The evidence
supports the working theory that growth options and firm
size play a crucial role in banks’ decisions to use RPE. Our
results are robust to different model specifications and are
consistent with existing evidence. We find that the likeli-
hood of RPE usage is decreasing with growth options. A
possible explanation for this result is that the implemen-
tation of RPE in high growth option banks might be too
costly due to difficulties in identifying the correct peer
group, rendering such banks less likely to use RPE.We also
find that larger banks are more inclined to use RPE in their
compensation contracts. This is a plausible finding. In
light of the recent financial crisis, high levels of CEO com-
pensation have attracted a lot of attention, and large banks
in particular have been under significant monitoring and
shareholder pressure. In response to such pressure, large
banks are more likely to have become incentivized to be
committed to RPE usage in determining the level of CEO
pay.
Our overarching findings suggest at least four things.
First, large international banks seem to entertain the use
of RPE in assessing the performance of their CEOs. This
holds more conclusively for banks that disclose their peer
groups. The latter implies the second point: disclosure
statements seem to have some merit, at least in our sam-
ple, and credibly reflect good corporate practice on that
score. Disclosing firms do not seem to limit themselves
to preaching water; they likely drink it, too. This finding
lends support to the credibility and thus to the informa-
tional value of RPE commitments. These first two points
have important consequences for shareholders. Left on
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Table 10 Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE with value-weighted peer groups
Panel A: weak-form RPE tests Panel B: weak-form RPE tests Panel C: strong-form RPE tests
– Full sample – Disclosure subsample – Disclosure subsample
Independent variables Industry peer group Industry/size peer group Industry peer group Industry/size peer group Industry/size peer group
Intercept 2.12 2.16 − 0.53 − 0.46 − 2.57
(0.13) (0.13) (0.86) (0.88) (0.41)
Firm stock return 0.52*** 0.54*** 0.66*** 0.69***
(0.00) [4.14] (0.00) [4.14] (0.00) [5.31] (0.00) [5.42]
Peer
return(industry)
− 0.23 − 0.63*
(0.19) [5.05] (0.07) [5.92]
Peer return
(industry/size)
− 0.28 − 0.65**
(0.11) [5.14] (0.05) [6.05]
Unsystematic
firm perf
0.69***
(0.00) [1.71]
Systematic firm
perf
0.06
(0.79) [3.15]
Firm size (sales) 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68***
(0.00) [4.04] (0.00) [4.04] (0.00) [5.05] (0.00) [5.05] (0.00) [5.05]
Growth options − 1.25 − 1.28 0.24 0.18 0.18
(0.33) [4.54] (0.32) [4.54] (0.93) [13.46] (0.95) [13.47] (0.95) [13.47]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 79.24% 79.30% 64.20% 64.38% 64.38%
Number of
observations
335 335 162 162 162
Note: Panels A and B show OLS regression results for the equation Compit = α0 + α1 · FirmPerf it + α2 · PeerPerf it + α3 · Cit + it . The first and third column show the results
from regressing log of total CEO compensation on stock return, peer performance composed of the firms within the same industry, and control variables. The second and
fourth columns document regression results based on the industry/size quartiles peer group approach by Albuquerque (2009). Panel A shows the results for the full sample,
and panel B reports the results for the disclosure subsample. Panel C documents OLS regression results for the equation Compit = δ0 + δ1 · UnsysFirmPerformanceit
+δ2 · SystFirmPerformanceit + δ3 · Cit + eit on the subsample of disclosing banks. We regress logarithm of CEO compensation on the unsystematic firm performance,
systematic firm performance, and control variables for 162 firm-year observations over the time span 2004–2013. We use industry/size peer group specification in order to
construct a systematic performance variable. All regressions include year, industry, and country dummies. For more details on systematic and unsystematic variable
construction, see the “Empirical model” section. Peer groups are constructed with value weights. Significance levels are two-sided and denoted as follows: 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗),
and 10% (∗). The corresponding p values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Variance inflation factors are reported in squared brackets
their own, CEOs would rather follow their own ways to
maximize utility. RPE helps align the interest of share-
holders and CEOs by creating incentives for CEOs to take
actions to increase shareholder wealth. Third, in line with
previous studies, our evidence indicates that industry/size
peers are better able to capture exogenous shocks than
industry peers alone. Finally, empirical evidence on RPE
runs the risk of diluting. In studies of RPE, it seems, if
nothing else for robustness, to stratify empirical samples
by disclosure. This should inform future research.
Endnotes
1 Implementing RPE does also entail potential costs.
(Gibbons and Murphy 1990, p. 31) discuss the benefits
and costs of RPE and state that: “One occupation for
which the risk-sharing advantages of RPE likely exceed
its counterproductive side-effects is top-level corporate
management.” By discussing several potential costs of
RPE in general (like costs induced by sabotage, collusion,
choice of the reference group, or production externali-
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Table 11 Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO compensation to RPE without the years 2007 and 2008
Panel A: weak-form RPE tests Panel B: weak-form RPE tests Panel C: strong-form RPE tests
– Full sample – Disclosure Subsample – Disclosure subsample
Independent variables Industry peer group Industry/size peer group Industry peer group Industry/size peer group Industry/size peer group
Intercept 0.25 0.28 − 2.36 − 1.93 − 6.47*
(0.89) (0.88) (0.48) (0.55) (0.06)
Firm stock return 0.58*** 0.61*** 0.63** 0.74***
(0.00) [2.42] (0.00) [2.50] (0.01) [2.91] (0.00) [2.99]
Peer return
(industry)
− 0.30 − 0.87**
(0.14) [2.63] (0.01) [3.14]
Peer return
(industry/size)
− 0.35* − 1.05***
(0.05) [2.45] (0.00) [2.81]
Unsystematic
firm perf
0.74***
(0.00) [1.79]
Systematic firm
perf
− 0.51*
(0.06) [1.96]
Firm size (sales) 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.73*** 0.74*** 0.74***
(0.00) [3.98] (0.00) [3.98] (0.00) [4.85] (0.00) [4.79] (0.00) [4.79]
Growth options 0.46 0.43 1.85 1.41 1.41
(0.79) [4.89] (0.80) [4.89] (0.57) [15.87] (0.65) [15.86] (0.65) [15.86]
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 79.30% 79.42% 67.48% 69.12% 69.12%
Number of
observations
267 267 128 128 128
Note: Panels A and B show OLS regression results for the equation Compit = α0 + α1 · FirmPerf it + α2 · PeerPerf it + α3 · Cit + it . The first and third columns show the results
from regressing log of total CEO compensation on stock return, peer performance composed of the firms within the same industry, and control variables. The second and
fourth columns document regression results based on the industry/size quartiles peer group approach by Albuquerque (2009). Panel A shows the results for the full sample,
and panel B reports the results for the disclosure subsample. Panel C documents OLS regression results for the equation Compit = δ0 + δ1 · UnsysFirmPerformanceit
+δ2 ·SystFirmPerformanceit +δ3 ·Cit + eit on the subsample of disclosing banks. We regress logarithm of CEO compensation on the unsystematic firm performance, systematic
firm performance, and control variables for 128 firm-year observations over the time span 2004–2006 and 2009–2013. We use industry/size peer group specification in order
to construct a systematic performance variable. All regressions include year, industry, and country dummies. For more details on systematic and unsystematic variable
construction, see the “Empirical model” section. Peer groups are constructed for seven different regions. Significance levels are two-sided and denoted as follows: 1% (∗ ∗ ∗),
5% (∗∗), and 10% (∗). The corresponding p values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. Variance inflation factors are reported in squared brackets
ties), they find that most of the costs are of minor rele-
vance for CEO compensation (for details see Gibbons and
Murphy 1990).
2 This is known as Bebchuck and Fried’s (2004) man-
agerial power hypothesis, which argues that there are
serious flaws in the corporate governance system, flaws
that allow executives to exert influence over the board
of the directors and thereby hold sway over the level
of their pay. Bebchuck and Fried provide evidence that
supports their hypothesis, which helps explain why the
actual pay-setting process is hard to reconcile with tradi-
tional contract theory.
3Antle and Smith (1986) examine RPE in a sample of
chemical, aerospace, and electronics firms. Rajgopal et al.
(2006) cover a wide range of industries with the three
largest groups being electric, gas, and sanitary services,
chemicals and allied products, and depository institu-
tions. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999b) and Aggarwal and
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Samwick (1999a) exploit ExecuComp data, compensa-
tion information for US firms. Joh (1999) tests RPE on a
sample of Japanese firms in the manufacturing sector.
4 For example, Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Albu-
querque (2009), and Black et al. (2015) find empirical
support for the RPE hypothesis. In contrast, Janakira-
man et al. (1992), Antle and Smith (1986), Aggarwal and
Samwick (1999b), Jensen and Murphy (1990), and Antle
and Smith (1986) fail to provide evidence for RPE or
present mixed results.
5US banks were excluded in our analysis because of a
regulatory event during the observed timeframe (see the
section “Compensation data” for details). To our knowl-
edge, there are only two studies that test RPE on US
banks, Barro and Barro (1990) and Crawford (1999). We
elaborate on them in the section “International banking
sample”.
6 Bikker and Haaf (2002) investigate the competitive
conditions and concentration in banking markets of 23
industrialized countries inside and outside Europe over
10 years. They form three sub-markets in terms of bank
sizes for each country and estimate the corresponding
competition conditions. They show that large banks oper-
ate mostly in international markets and are exposed to
strong competition. On the other hand, smaller banks
operate mainly in local markets and are facing less com-
petition.
7 Bebchuk et al. (2010) conclude that the pay structures
in Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers had provided top
executives with overbearing risk-taking incentives. This
misalignment let them focus on their company’s short-
term performance while paying too little attention to the
long-term value.
8We collect this information from the annual reports
and proxy statements of the respective banks. See
the “Compensation data” section for more details.
9Our classification of RPE statements is less strict than
Gong et al. (2011), so our estimates on its informational
value are, if anything, to be interpreted conservatively. See
the section “Compensation data” for more details.
10 Since 1980, many states in the US have passed so-
called interstate banking laws that allow local banks
to be acquired by out-of-state banks. This has led to
higher competition among banks on the interstate mar-
ket and has had consequences on the pay-performance
relation.
11 The results are inconclusive. For example, Saunders
et al. (1990) find evidence for this hypothesis and observe
a positive and statistically significant relation between
bank risk and stock held by the executive. In contrast,
Houston and James (1995) provide results that are incon-
sistent with this hypothesis.
12Originally, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) defined
RPE as α2
α1
. They test H0 : α2α1 ≥ 0 against the alternative
H1 : α2α1 < 0. Since α1 is expected to be positive, most
of the literature that uses the model proposed by Holm-
strom and Milgrom test whether α2 < 0. We follow that
approach.
13Note that α3 is a row vector.
14 Firm-specific fixed effects in firm performance would
be included in the unsystematic part of the performance,
potentially biasing the coefficient estimate βi used to
determine systematic performance. We address this issue
by including control variables (including industry and
country dummies) in the first step of the regression. Still,
because the correlation between peer performance and
the control variables is low, excluding themwould have no
major impact on the results.
15We retain US banks as possible peers, however. See
the section “Peer group composition”.
16 For EU firms, for example, Ferrarini and Moloney
(2005, p. 318) point out that peer group disclosure is not
required. We are not aware that this has changed since
2005.
17 The low number of firms in the last year is because
not all firms in our sample had yet released proxy circulars
by the time we collected the data.
18Compared to the correlation coefficients in
Albuquerque (2009, Table 4), our values seem rather high
(e.g., 0.45 vs. 0.79 for the correlation between firm perfor-
mance and industry/size peer return). One explanation
for this difference is our focus on the banking industry.
Another explanation is the financial crisis. It turns out
that the years 2007 and 2008 explain roughly half of the
difference (excluding these years yields a value of 0.63
for our sample; see Table 16). See also our robustness
check in section “Exclusion of financial crisis years” The
correlation coefficients for our disclosing subsample do
not differ substantially from our full sample. We do not
report these results separately.
19A variance inflation factor (VIF) indicates how
much the variance of a variable is increased because of
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collinearity. There is no clear rule when a VIF indicates
high multicollinearity. A rule of thumb is that values big-
ger than 10 are considered to be problematic. In our
results, the variables of interest are below this threshold.
We are grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this
to attention.
20Datastream provides up to five different SIC codes for
each firm, in order of relevance. We include a firm if its
first SIC code is one of the following: 6021, 6022, 6029,
6035, 6036, 6061, 6062, 6081, 6082, 6091, 6111, 6141,
6159, 6162, or 6712. If the first SIC code is either 6311,
6211, 6153, 6163, or 6221, we include the firm only if one
of its four other SIC-codes is in the previous list.
21 Jensen and Murphy (1990) aggregate peer perfor-
mance based on the two-digit SIC level or a market
index, Janakiraman et al. (1992) match their peers on the
same two-digit SIC industry level. Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999a) use two-, three-, and four-digit SIC levels in order
to compose a peer group, and Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999b) choose peers in the same two-, three-, and four-
digit SIC level industry or a market index.
22 In the Appendix, we provide two additional robust-
ness checks beyond the ones presented in the subse-
quent section “Extensions and robustness checks”. First,
the results are robust across different treatments of stan-
dard errors (see the section “Clustered standard errors”).
Second, we implement a novel Kernel-based peer group
construction approach with three different Kernel func-
tions: a standard normal probability distribution function
(pdf), a “cosine” pdf, and a uniform pdf. These general-
ized approaches implement different weights depending
on a peer’s size “distance” from the target firm’s size. The
according results are reported in the section “Regression
results (kernel-based peers)” (Table 14).
23 The result does not remain statistically significant
when we conduct the complementary changes regression
presented in Albuquerque (2009). Untabulated results
show statistically insignificant coefficients on indus-
try/size peer returns. Neither are we able to document
robustness when we use the Kernel-based peer group
construction approach from the previous endnote.
24 In contrast to the full sample, for the subsample this
result holds up to the Kernel-based approach presented
in endnote 22. For more details see Panel B of Table 14 in
the “Weak tests of RPE (disclosure subsample)” section of
the Appendix.
25Untabulated results for the non-disclosing subsam-
ple support this reasoning. On their own, non-disclosing
banks do not seem to make use of RPE.
26 For the robustness tests, see panel C in Table 14 in
the “Strong-form tests of RPE (disclosure subsample)”
section of the Appendix.
27 Strictly speaking, we do not examine the likelihood of
using RPE but the more encompassing likelihood of dis-
closing peer groups. This translates into a conservative
estimation. Because peer group usage is only a neces-
sary condition for RPE, our findings are reflecting a lower
likelihood bound of using RPE.
28When using total assets instead of sales as a proxy
for size, this coefficient becomes insignificant. The results
are not reported, but are available upon request by the
authors.
29 The regression results based on our self-created
Kernel-based peer group specifications are presented in
Table 15 in the “Associated factors of RPE” section of the
Appendix and are similar to the results in this section.
30 See https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/
articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups.
31We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this
suggestion.
32Detailed results are available upon request by the
authors.
33 There is no Cosine Distribution to our knowledge,
but if there was one this would be its probability density
function.
Appendix
Sample banks and (non-US) global systemically important
banks
Kernel-based peer group construction
This appendix addresses some issues one might have with
the industry/size quartile approach and introduces a novel
Kernel-based alternative. This alternative extends Albu-
querque (2009) with a more flexible peer group construc-
tion method. The following example illustrates a possible
caveat of the industry/size quartile approach. In Albu-
querque (2009), all firms are partitioned and ranked into
four size groups (per industry). In ascending order, the
first group contains 25% of the firms with the smallest size,
and the fourth group contains 25% of the firms with the
largest size. The boundaries between the four groups, the
so-called breakpoints, thus lie on 25%, 50%, and 75% of the
ranked values of firm size. Now let us assume that we want
to test the RPE hypothesis on a target company that is very
close to the breakpoint between the first and the second
quartile, but just happens to fall into the first one. In this
particular case, it is not readily obvious why the first peer
group, and not the second one, should be assigned to the
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Table 12 List of international banks in the full sample
Bank Country Sample years Year with peer group (no if none) Total assets
Swedbank Sweden 2005–2013 No 226.73
Crédit Agricole France 2005–2013 2011–2013 1,929.70
China Minsheng Bank China 2009–2011 No 212.97
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group Japan 2009–2012 No 2,384.77
Banco de Sabadell Spain 2011–2012 No 128.51
Huaxia Bank China 2006–2012 No 109.68
DNB Norway 2004–2013 No 252.47
BNP Paribas France 2006–2012 No 2,410.40
Commonwealth Bank of Australia Australia 2004–2013 2004–2013 455.20
China Construction Bank China 2007–2012 No 1,283.50
Bank of China China 2008–2012 No 1,314.41
CIMB Group Holdings Malaysia 2007–2013 No 74.66
HSBC Holdings UK 2004–2013 2007–2009 2,050.74
Nordea Bank Sweden 2006–2013 2006–2013 674.29
Banco Santander Spain 2005–2013 2008; 2010–2013 1,331.30
SEB Sweden 2004–2013 2005–2013 298.48
Société Générale France 2005–2012 2006–2012 1,337.02
Malayan Bank Malaysia 2009–2013 2012–2013 119.15
Public Bank Malaysia 2007–2013 No 65.19
Firstaid South Africa 2004–2013 2004 – 2008 92.45
Lloyds Banking Group UK 2004–2013 2007; 2013 969.22
Barclays UK 2006–2012 2006–2011 2,267.35
Royal Bank of Scotland Group UK 2011–2012 201 –2012 2,287.02
National Australia Bank Australia 2009–2013 2009–2013 659.68
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Canada 2006–2012 2006 – 2012 307.45
Commerzbank Germany 2004–2013 2004–2013 800.10
Bank of Montreal Canada 2004–2013 2004–2013 343.25
Bank of Nova Scotia Canada 2005–2012 2005–2012 401.29
Deutsche Bank Germany 2005–2013 2005 – 2013 2,210.16
Westpac Banking Australia 2004–2013 2004–2013 395.52
Toronto-Dominion Bank Canada 2004–2013 2004–2013 464.48
Royal Bank of Canada Canada 2004–2013 2004–2013 563.69
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, Inc. Japan 2011–2012 No 1,703.63
Oversea-Chinese Banking Singapore 2004–2013 No 132.09
UniCredit Italy 2009–2012 2009–2012 1,293.11
Intesa Sanpaolo Italy 2012–2013 2012–2013 843.01
Banco Popular Español Spain 2005–2013 No 148.11
United Overseas Bank Singapore 2004–2013 No 127.75
DBS Group Holdings Singapore 2004–2013 2011–2012 173.54
UBS Switzerland 2007–2012 No 1,674.39
Credit Suisse Group Switzerland 2007–2013 2007–2013 1,072.69
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Australia 2009–2013 2009–2013 514.43
Standard Bank Group South Africa 2010–2013 2013 187.42
Bank of East Asia Hong Kong 2005–2013 No 54.69
National Bank of Canada Canada 2007–2013 No 131.96
Svenska Handelsbanken Sweden 2008–2013 No 317.42
Note: This table lists, by country, all 46 banks in our full sample. It also shows the time span of their sample affiliation, the years in which the banks self-report that they employ
a peer group for determining CEO compensation, and average total assets (over the sample years) in billion USD
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Table 13 List of non-US global systemically important banks
(G-SIBs), 2011–2012
Bank Included/reason for exclusion
Deutsche Bank Yes
HSBC Yes
Bank of China Yes
Barclays Yes
BNP Paribas Yes
Mitsubishi UFJ FG Yes
Credit Suisse Yes
Crédit Agricole Yes
ING Bank No CEO compensation data
Mizuho Financial Group No CEO compensation data
Nordea Yes
Royal Bank of Scotland Yes
Santander Yes
Société Générale Yes
Standard Chartered Yes
Sumitomo Mitsui FG Yes
UBS Yes
Unicredit Group Yes
Dexia No CEO compensation data
Commerzbank Yes
Lloyds Yes
BBVA No CEO compensation data
Groupe BPCE Index weight smaller than 0.02
Note: This table provides a list of non-US global systemically important banks (G-
SIBs) from 2011 to 2012. We indicate if the bank is included in the full sample (’yes’) or
list the cause for its exclusion. The list of G-SIBs is published by the Financial Stability
Board (FSB). For details see: http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_131111.pdf
target firm. Our alternative method of peer group compo-
sition addresses this issue. For every target firm, we assign
a unique peer group that is determined by the target firm’s
size. We implement this with a Kernel-based weighting
scheme. Firms that are closer to the target firm in terms of
firm size receive a weight specific to the distance from the
target firm. More concretely, a weighting function assigns
a higher weight to a peer firm if it exhibits a smaller dis-
tance to the target firm in terms of firm size (we will also
allow for equal weights). We measure the differences of
firm sizes as follows:
Di = SizeT − Sizei where i = 1, ...,N . (A.6)
SizeT denotes the size of the target company measured
in terms of firm sales, and Sizei is a proxy for the size of
all other firms. We standardize the ”distances” by dividing
them with the cross-sectional standard deviation, s(Di):
D∗i =
Di
s(Di)
where i = 1, ...,N (A.7)
From these standardized distances, we construct weights
using a kernel weighting function. The firm i in the sample
of N firms will be assigned the weight
wi = K(D∗i ) (A.8)
Additionally, we create weights by multiplying the stan-
dardized difference with the following scaling factor (SF):
SFi = Median
( s(Sizei)
s(SizeT )
)
· 2
D∗∗i = D∗i · SF
wi = K(D∗∗i ).
(A.9)
For robustness, we use three types of kernel functions to
assign weights: (1) the probability density function (pdf)
of the standard normal distribution, (2) the pdf of the
uniform distribution, and (3) the pdf of the ”cosine dis-
tribution”.33In addition, we standardize each weight with
the sum of all weights. This amounts to the following peer
performance weight:
wi∗ = wi∑N
j=1 wj
(A.10)
such that
N
∑
i=1
wi∗ = 1. (A.11)
Finally, we use the performance weights and individual
firm performance Perfi to construct each target firm’s peer
group as follows:
PeerPerf =
N
∑
i=1
w∗i · Perfi where i = 1, ...,N . (A.12)
Regression results (kernel-based peers)
Full sample of banks
Panel A of Table 14 reports the results from regressing
the logarithm of total compensation on firm stock return,
Kernel-based peers, growth options, and log of sales. The
parameter estimates are negative and insignificant, which
is not consistent with the presence of RPE. The estimates
hardly differ across the different Kernel specifications.
They are − 0.26 (p value = 0.38) for the normal Kernel
function, − 0.16 (p value = 0.54) for the cosine Kernel
function, and −0.20 (p value = 0.48) for the uniform
Kernel function. In panel A of Table 14 we have slightly
adjusted the Kernel-based approach by multiplying the
difference of the firm size by the scaling factor intro-
duced in the previous section. We test the presence of
RPE by regressing the log of total CEO compensation
on firm stock return, peer performance, growth options,
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Table 15 Logit regression of RPE usage in executive compensation contracts
Unscaled Scaled
Independent variables Knor Kcos Kuni Knor Kcos Kuni
Intercept 15.31 14.93 15.47 14.93 14.72 15.12
(0.25) (0.26) (0.24) (0.26) (0.27) (0.25)
Compensation 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48
(0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) (0.37)
Firm perf − 0.28 − 0.29 − 0.21 − 0.24 − 0.25 − 0.22
(0.74) (0.73) (0.80) (0.78) (0.76) (0.79)
Peer return (Kernel) 1.16 0.95 0.91 0.82 0.77 0.72
(0.46) (0.45) (0.55) (0.51) (0.50) (0.53)
Firm size (sales) 2.69*** 2.71*** 2.69*** 2.70*** 2.71*** 2.71***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Growth options − 19.90* − 19.52 − 19.99* − 19.50 − 19.31 − 19.65*
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 52.64% 52.64% 52.62% 52.64% 52.64% 52.63%
Number of observation 335 335 335 335 335 335
Note: The table documents logit regression results for the equation yit = γ0 + γ1 · Compit + γ2 · FirmPerf it + γ3 · PeerPerf it + γ4 · Cit + uit . The dependent variable is RPE, an
indicator variable which is equal to 1 if the firm discloses peer group use in the compensation contracts. We regress RPE on firm performance, peer returns, firm size, and
growth options for 318 firm-year observations over the time span 2004–2013. We include year, country, and industry dummies. We report three versions of the Kernel-based
approached: (1) based on the pdf of the standard normal distribution (Knor), 2) based the pdf of the uniform distribution (Kuni), and (3) based the pdf of the “cosine
distribution” (Kcos). The panel “scaled” refers to the variants where we multiply the standardized differences with a scaling factor, as described in the “Kernel-based peer
group construction” section. We report Cox and Snell’s R2. Significance levels are two-sided and are denoted as follows: 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗), and 10% (∗). The corresponding p
values are reported in parentheses below each coefficient estimate
and log of sales. We also include year, country, and indus-
try dummies. The coefficient on the log of firm stock
return is again positive and statistically significant at the
1% level for every specification. The negative coefficients
on the Kernel-based peer portfolio keep persisting.
They are − 0.22 (p value = 0.39) for the normal Kernel
function, − 0.20 (p value = 0.38) for the cosine Kernel
function, and − 0.27 (p value = 0.29) for the uniform
Kernel function. The adjusted Kernel-based approach
reports smaller p values. The coefficients remain
insignificant, revealing no evidence of RPE in the full
sample.
Table 16 Pearson correlation coefficients without the years 2007 and 2008
Firm stock return Industry peer return Industry/size
peer
return
Log(sales) Log(assets) Growth options Total
compensation
Firm stock return 1.00
Industry peer
return
0.57*** 1.00
Industry/size peer
return
0.63*** 0.96*** 1.00
Log(sales) − 0.15** − 0.08 − 0.04 1.00
Log(assets) − 0.18*** − 0.11* − 0.06 0.96*** 1.00
Growth options 0.32*** 0.17*** 0.13** − 0.50*** − 0.60*** 1.00
Total compensa-
tion
0.04 − 0.07 − 0.07 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.02 1.00
Note: This table shows Pearson product moment correlation coefficients between total compensation, performance measures, and control variables. The sample consists of
267 observations covering the time period 2004–2006 and 2009–2013. Significance levels are denoted as follows: 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*)
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Weak tests of RPE (disclosure subsample)
Panel B of Table 14 documents the same regression proce-
dure on the subsample of banks that explicitly disclose the
use of peers in determining their level of CEO compen-
sation. Under the Kernel-based peer group specification,
external shocks are removed from the compensation con-
tract, which is consistent with RPE. The peer coefficients
do not differ much across the Kernel specifications. They
are − 0.99 (p value = 0.03) for the normal Kernel function,
− 0.81 (p value = 0.05) for the ”cosine” Kernel func-
tion, and − 0.88 (p value = 0.06) for the uniform Kernel
function. The coefficient on firm stock performance is
positive, statistically significant, and ranges from 0.70 to
0.77. Panel B of Table 14 also reports the regression results
with the adjusted Kernel-based peers (columns labeled
”scaled”). All the Kernel-based peer coefficients keep a
negative and statistically significant sign, soundly reject-
ing the null hypothesis of no RPE. The coefficient of the
normal Kernel peer group is − 0.82 (p value = 0.03), of the
cosine Kernel peer group − 0.83 (p value = 0.01), and of
the uniform Kernel peer group − 0.77 (p value = 0.04).
Strong-form tests of RPE (disclosure subsample)
We now use strong-form RPE tests in order to test the
RPE hypothesis on the disclosing subsample. We use the
Kernel-based method to construct a systematic perfor-
mance variable and run the same regression model. Panel
C of Table 14 reports the results. We document insignifi-
cant parameter estimates on systematic firm performance.
The coefficient of the normal Kernel peer group is 0.04
(p value = 0.85), of the cosine Kernel peer group 0.08 (p
value = 0.70), and of the uniformKernel peer group 0.09 (p
value = 0.65). Our results are robust to different specifica-
tions of the weights in the Kernel-based approach, which
is reported in panel C of Table 14. The parameter esti-
mates of the normal Kernel peer group is 0.07 (p value
= 0.75), of the cosine Kernel peer group 0.01 (p value =
0.96), and of the uniform Kernel peer group 0.09 (p value
= 0.66). The unsystematic firm performance is significant
at the 1% level for every Kernel-based specification.
Associated factors of RPE
In this section, we estimate Eq. (5). For this purpose, as
in the previous section, we use the alternative peer group
definitions based on the Kernel approach. The results are
presented in Table 15. The parameter estimates on firm
size remain statistically significant and have the same sign.
The firm size coefficient of the normal Kernel peer group
is 2.68 (p value = 0.00), of the cosine Kernel peer group
2.70 (p value = 0.00), and of the uniform Kernel peer
group 2.69 (p value = 0.00). The coefficient for growth
options remains negative and in most cases statistically
significant. The results are qualitatively similar when we
use the adjusted Kernel-based approach. The coefficients
are − 19.64 (p value = 0.09) for the normal Kernel peer
group, − 19.28 (p value = 0.10) for the cosine Kernel peer
group, and for the uniform Kernel peer group − 19.74
(p value = 0.09).
Correlation coefficients of non-crisis years
Table 16 shows Pearson correlations obtained without the
years 2007 and 2008.
Clustered standard errors
Here, we consider the same regression procedure (Eq. (1))
for the full sample of 42 banks but include clustered stan-
dard errors across industry codes. Table 17 reports the
regression results when peers are based on industry and
industry/size. The coefficient on industry peer is − 0.06
(p value = 0.87), and the coefficient on industry/size peers
is − 0.31 (p value = 0.06). That is to say, we find qual-
itatively similar results to those presented in panel A of
Table 4. In addition, in unreported results, we find that the
results for the Kernel-based approaches are robust to the
inclusion of clustered standard errors.
Table 17 Regressions estimating the sensitivity of CEO
compensation to RPE
Independent variables Industry peer group Industry/size peer group
Intercept 2.06* 2.15*
(0.07) (0.08)
Firm stock return 0.47*** 0.55***
(0.00) (0.00)
Peer return (industry) − 0.12
(0.75)
Peer return (industry/size) − 0.32*
(0.08)
Firm size (sales) 0.36*** 0.36***
(0.00) (0.00)
Growth options − 1.19 − 1.27
(0.21) (0.21)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 79.14% 79.36%
Number of observations 335 335
Number of clusters 5 5
Note: The table shows OLS regression results for the equation
Compit = α0 +α1 ·FirmPerf it +α2 ·PeerPerf it +α3 ·Cit +it . The first column presents
the results from regressing log of total CEO compensation on stock return, industry
peer performance, and other variables. The second column documents regression
results based on industry and size quartiles, that is, Albuquerque (2009)’s approach.
OLS estimation is based on clustered standard errors. Firm size and growth options
for the period 2004 to 2013 are also reported. We include year, industry, and country
dummies. The corresponding p values are reported in parentheses below each
coefficient estimate. We report significance levels for 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗), and 10% (∗)
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